> ———————————————————————–
>
> DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
>
> Office of the Secretary
>
> National Institute of Standards and Technology
>
> International Trade Administration
>
> National Telecommunications and Information Administration
>
> [Docket No.: 100721305-0305-01]
>
>
> Cybersecurity, Innovation and the Internet Economy
>
> AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce; National
>
> Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce;
> International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; and
> National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S.
> Department of Commerce.
>
> ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
>
> ———————————————————————–
>
> SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force is
> conducting a comprehensive review of the nexus between cybersecurity
>
> challenges in the commercial sector and innovation in the Internet
> economy. The Department seeks comments from all stakeholders, including
> the commercial, academic and civil society sectors, on measures to
> improve cybersecurity while sustaining innovation. Preserving
>
> innovation, as well as private sector and consumer confidence in the
> security of the Internet economy, are important for promoting economic
> prosperity and social well-being overall. In particular, the Department
>
> seeks to develop an up-to-date understanding of the current public
> policy and operational challenges affecting cybersecurity, as those
> challenges may shape the future direction of the Internet and its
> commercial use, both domestically and globally. After analyzing
>
> comments on this Notice, the Department intends to issue a report that
> will contribute to the Administration’s domestic and international
> policies and activities in advancing both cybersecurity and the
> Internet economy.
>
> DATES: Comments are due on or before September 13, 2010.
>
> ADDRESSES: Written comments may be submitted by mail to Diane
> Honeycutt, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau
> Drive, Stop 8930, Gaithersburg, MD 20899. Submissions may be in any of
>
> the following formats: HTML, ASCII, Word, rtf, or pdf. Online
> submissions in electronic form may be sent to cybertaskforce@doc.gov.
> Paper submissions should include a three and one-half inch computer
>
> diskette or compact disc (CD). Diskettes or CDs should be labeled with
> the name and organizational affiliation of the filer and the name of
> the word processing program used to create the document. Comments will
>
> be posted at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/internetpolicytaskforce <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.ntia.doc.gov/internetpolicytaskforce> and http:/
>
> /csrc.nist.gov <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://csrc.nist.gov>.
>
> FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions about this Notice
> contact: Jon Boyens, International Trade Administration, U.S.
> Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue, NW., Room 2806,
>
> Washington, DC 20230, telephone (202) 482-0573 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              (202) 482-0573      end_of_the_skype_highlighting, e-mail
> Jon.Boyens@trade.gov; or Alfred Lee, National Telecommunications and
> Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401
>
> Constitution Avenue, NW., Room 4725, Washington, DC 20230, telephone
> (202) 482-1880 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              (202) 482-1880      end_of_the_skype_highlighting, e-mail Alee@ntia.doc.gov. Please direct media inquires
> to the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Office of
>
> Public and Business Affairs at (301) 975-6478 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              (301) 975-6478      end_of_the_skype_highlighting.
>
> SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Internet has become vitally important to
> U.S. innovation, prosperity, education, civic activity and cultural
> life as well as aspects of our national security. A top priority of the
>
> Department of Commerce is to ensure that the Internet remains an open
> and trusted infrastructure, both for commercial entities and
> individuals. In pursuit of this priority, the Department has created an
> Internet Policy Task Force whose mission is to identify leading policy
>
> challenges and to recommend possible solutions. The Task Force
> leverages expertise across many bureaus at the Department, including
> those responsible for cybersecurity standards and best practices,
> information and communications policy, international trade,
>
> intellectual property, business advocacy and export control. This
> Notice of Inquiry is one in a series of inquiries from the Task Force.
> Other reviews examine information privacy, global free flow of
> information on the Internet, and online copyright protection issues.
>
> The Task Force may explore additional areas in the future.
>     The Task Force’s cybersecurity work aims to identify public
> policies and private-sector norms that can: (1) Promote conduct by
> firms and consumers that collectively will sustain growth in the
>
> Internet economy and improve the level of security of the
> infrastructure and online environment that support it; (2) enhance
> individual and collaborative efforts by those actors who are in the
> best position to assist firms and their customers in addressing
>
> cybersecurity challenges; (3) improve the ability of firms and
> consumers to keep pace with ever-evolving cybersecurity risks; and (4)
> promote individual privacy and civil liberties. Public policies and
> private-sector practices that promote innovation and enhance
>
> cybersecurity will help assure that the Internet remains fertile ground
> for an expanding range of beneficial commercial and consumer activity.
>     Internet Growth and Evolving Cybersecurity Challenges: The Internet
>
> allows users to gather, store, process, and transfer vast amounts of
> data, including proprietary and sensitive business, transactional, and
> personal data. At the same time that businesses and consumers rely more
>
> and more on such capabilities, cybersecurity risks continue to plague
> the Internet economy, and it seems highly unlikely that all risks will
> ever be completely eliminated.
>
> [[Page 44217]]
>
>     Sources of cybersecurity risks include individual criminals,
>
> organized crime, terrorists, and nation-states. Cyber intrusions and
> attacks are mounted against commercial and individual users, as well as
> against government, military, and critical infrastructure networks
> (e.g., energy, water, sewage, transportation, banking, and financial
>
> networks). These intrusions and attacks often seek to steal,
> manipulate, destroy, or deny access to sensitive data and sometimes
> attempt to disable or disrupt individual systems.1 Media outlets
> regularly report on the activities of those who disseminate viruses,
>
> spyware, and other malware, as well as those who spoof e-mail
> addresses, distribute spam, phish for sensitive personal information,
> and create botnets.2 Cyber threats can originate from anywhere in the
> world. They not only target computers, but also mobile phones and other
>
> devices connected to the Internet.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     1 See, e.g., Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and
> Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, May 29,
>
> 2009, at 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_
>
> Policy_Review_final.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf> (Cyberspace Policy Review), citing
> Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the
> Intelligence Community for the Armed Services Committee, Statement
> for the Record, March 10, 2009, at 39.
>
>     2 See, e.g., id. at 2 (listing several examples of media
> reported incidents); see also David S. Wall, Cybercrime, Media and
> Insecurity: The Shaping of Public Perceptions of Cybercrime, 22
> International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 45 (2008). A
>
> botnet, short for robot network, is an aggregation of compromised
> computers that are taken over via network connections without the
> knowledge or consent of their owners. Michigan Information Sharing
> and Analysis Center, Monthly Cyber Security Tips Newsletter
>
> (September 2007), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cybersecurity/
>
> CSNewsletter_September2007_207450_7.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cybersecurity/CSNewsletter_September2007_207450_7.pdf>.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     Cybersecurity risks seem to evolve as rapidly as the Internet
> expands, and those risks are becoming increasingly global in nature.
>
> Keeping pace with cybersecurity risks requires all users, even the most
> sophisticated users, to be aware of the threats and improve upon their
> security practices on an ongoing basis. Creating incentives to motivate
>
> all parties in the Internet economy to make appropriate security
> investments in response to risks they face requires a careful balance
> of technical and public policy measures.
>     The constantly evolving nature of the threats and vulnerabilities
>
> not only affects individual firms and their customers, but collectively
> the threats pose a persistent economic and national security challenge.
> Computing devices are highly and increasingly interconnected, meaning
>
> that security deficiencies in a limited number of systems can be
> exploited to launch cyber intrusions or attacks on other systems. Put
> another way, poor cyber “hygiene” on one Internet-connected computer
>
> negatively impacts other connected computers.
>     Given the breadth and importance of this challenge, government and
> private sector actors have for many years been pursuing a range of
> mitigation strategies. Currently at the Federal level, the White
>
> House’s Cybersecurity Coordinator is responsible for setting a national
> agenda and for coordinating Executive Branch cybersecurity activities.
> Specific Federal activities in this area include research and training,
>
> threat reporting and analysis, information collection and
> dissemination, consumer awareness, and policy development. In addition,
> the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is
> responsible for overseeing Federal agency information security policies
>
> and practices under the Federal Information Security Management Act of
> 2002.
>     The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an especially
> important Federal actor that serves as a focal point for the security
>
> of cyberspace. It provides consolidated intrusion detection, incident
> analysis and cyber response capabilities to protect Federal agencies’
> external access points, including access to the Internet. While the
>
> Department of Defense (DOD) defends military and national security
> systems, DHS has the lead in securing federal civilian systems. DHS
> also works with public and private stakeholders to protect critical
> infrastructure and key resources (CIKR).3 A number of entities within
>
> the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of
> Investigation, as well as the United States Secret Service in DHS,
> track and prosecute cyber crimes. The National Science and Technology
> Council and its Committee on Technology serve as the coordinating
>
> organization over the Networking and Information Technology Research
> and Development (NITRD) program, which is the primary mechanism by
> which the U.S. Government coordinates its unclassified networking and
> IT research and development investments, including cybersecurity
>
> research and development.4
> —————————————————————————
>
>     3 DHS oversees critical infrastructure protection, operates
> the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT),
>
> oversees implementation of the Trusted Internet Connection
> initiative, and takes other actions to help secure both the federal
> civilian government systems and the private sector. DHS exercises
> primary responsibility within the executive branch for the
>
> operational aspects of Federal agency cybersecurity with respect to
> the Federal information systems that fall within the Federal
> Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). These
> responsibilities include overseeing the government-wide and agency-
>
> specific implementation of and reporting on cybersecurity policies
> and guidance; overseeing and assisting government-wide and agency-
> specific efforts to provide adequate, risk-based and cost-effective
> cybersecurity. Under FISMA, the Director of the Office of Management
>
> and Budget (OMB) oversees federal agency information security
> policies and practices, and OMB has directed all departments and
> agencies to coordinate and cooperate with DHS as necessary to carry
> out its FISMA responsibilities. OMB Memorandum M-10-28 Clarifying
>
> Cybersecurity Responsibilities and Activities of the Executive
> Office of the President and the Department of Homeland Security
> (DHS), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-
>
> 28.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-28.pdf>.
>     4 In addition, the Federal Communications Commission, an
> independent regulatory agency, is considering launching a voluntary
> certification program to encourage communications service providers
>
> to implement cybersecurity best practices. See http://
>
> hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-63A1.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-63A1.pdf>.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     The Department of Commerce has programs that complement and support
>
> these and other federal efforts. For example, the Department’s National
> Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 5 develops standards and
> guides for securing non-national security Federal information systems.
>
> It defines minimum security requirements for federally held information
> and for information systems. NIST is also a primary contributor and
> member of the NITRD program, leading research and development in
> computer forensics tool testing, seamless mobility, trustworthy
>
> information systems, information security automation, combinatorial
> testing, next generation access control, and Internet infrastructure
> protection (with DHS funding). NIST also is responsible for the
> National Software Reference Library, National Vulnerability Database,
>
> and Security Content Automation Protocol. NIST identifies methods and
> metrics for assessing the effectiveness of security requirements;
> evaluates private sector security policies for potential federal agency
> use; and provides general cybersecurity technical support and
>
> assistance to the private sector and federal agencies. Moreover, over
> the
>
> [[Page 44218]]
>
> past two decades, the Department’s National Telecommunications and
> Information Administration (NTIA), in its role as principal adviser to
>
> the President on telecommunications and information policies, has
> worked closely with other parts of government on broadband deployment,
> Internet policy development, securing the Internet namespace, and other
>
> issues. As an advocate for our nation’s businesses, NTIA has played an
> instrumental role in developing policies that have helped commerce over
> the Internet flourish.6
> —————————————————————————
>
>     5 The 1965 Brooks Act gave the National Bureau of Standards
> (now NIST) responsibilities for federal information technology
> standards. Public Law 89-306 (Oct. 30, 1965). The Computer Security
> Act of 1987 reaffirmed the responsibilities of NIST for the security
>
> of unclassified, non-military government computer systems. Public
> Law. 100-235 (Jan. 8, 1988). Under the law, the role of the National
> Security Agency (NSA) was limited in the civilian security realm to
> providing technical assistance. The 2002 Cyber Security Research and
>
> Development Act authorized funding to NIST for computer and network
> security research and established status reporting requirements.
> Public Law 107-305 (Nov. 27, 2002). The 2002 Federal Information
> Security Management Act provided for development and maintenance by
>
> NIST of minimum controls required to protect federal information and
> information systems. Title III of Public Law 107-347 (Dec. 17,
> 2002).
>     6 See 47 U.S.C. 902 (b)(2)(D) (providing that NTIA has “[t]he
>
> authority to serve as the President’s principal adviser on
> telecommunications policies pertaining to the Nation’s economic and
> technological advancement and to the regulation of the
> telecommunications industry”); see also Federal Communications
>
> Commission, Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan, at 55
> (2010), http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-
>
> plan.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf>. In 1993, the White House formed the Information
> Infrastructure Task Force (White House Task Force), chaired by the
> Secretary of Commerce, to develop telecommunications and information
> policies to promote the development of the Internet. In 1997, the
>
> White House Clinton Administration published A Framework for Global
> Electronic Commerce. This was the work of an interagency working
> group of high level representatives of several cabinet agencies,
> including the Departments of Treasury, State, Justice and Commerce,
>
> as well as the Executive Office of the President, including the
> Council of Economic Advisors, the National Security Council, the
> Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of the Vice
> President, and the U.S. Trade Representative. Independent
>
> commissions including the Federal Communications Commission and the
> Federal Trade Commission also contributed to the working group. In
> several instances, the Framework notes NTIA’s collaborative efforts,
> in conjunction with other federal agencies, such as the State
>
> Department, Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Trade Representative, to
> explore opportunities for international cooperation to protect
> consumers and to prosecute false, deceptive, and fraudulent
> commercial practices in cyberspace. President William J. Clinton and
>
> Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic
> Commerce (1997) (pagination not available), http://
>
> clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/ <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/>; see also Memorandum on
> Electronic Commerce, 33 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc 1006 (July 1, 1997).
> —————————————————————————
>
>
>     Through its Internet Policy Task Force, the Department intends to
> recommend public policies and private-sector norms that can markedly
> improve the overall cybersecurity posture of private sector
> infrastructure operators, software and service providers, and users
>
> outside the critical infrastructure and key resources realm and of
> their customers.
>     Cybersecurity and Commerce: Due to the Department’s over-arching
> responsibility to advance the nation’s commercial interests, the Task
>
> Force is focused on the cybersecurity challenges facing businesses and
> consumers that use the Internet.
>     The nation’s e-commerce interests are significant. Growth in online
> sales and expanding use of the Internet are creating new jobs and
>
> contributing directly to our economic recovery. Businesses of all sizes
> increasingly use the Internet to order and track inventory, sell
> products and services, store financial and other proprietary
> information, and interact with their customers. These shifts in
>
> business practices and other measures have led to a greatly increased
> average growth in productivity over the last fifteen years.7 Over the
> long term, such growth benefits our global competitiveness.8
> —————————————————————————
>
>     7 Executive Office of the President of the United States,
> Economic Report of the President (Feb. 2010), available at http://
>
> www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea/economic-report-of-the-
> president <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea/economic-report-of-the-president>.
>     8 The Nation relies increasingly on the Internet not only as a
> platform for commercial activities, but also as a vehicle for
>
> innovation, national competitiveness, and a tool for efficiency,
> transparency and accountability in government.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     Taking into account both business-to-consumer and business-to-
>
> business transactions, online commerce in 2007 accounted for more than
> $3 trillion in revenue for U.S. companies.9 In the business-to-
> consumer e-commerce space, the United States economy enjoyed an
> increase in revenue of more than 500 percent between 1999 and 2007.10
>
> Even during the recent economic downturn, the economic benefits
> provided by the Internet economy increased. In 2009, online retail
> sales grew 2.0 percent to reach $134.9 billion,11 while total retail
> sales fell 7 percent in that same year. Also in 2009, U.S. mobile
>
> commerce sales grew more than 200 percent compared to the previous
> year, reaching $1.2 billion.12 Analysts expect this growth to
> continue in 2010, projecting $2.4 billion in mobile commerce.13
> —————————————————————————
>
>     9 U.S. Census Bureau, E-Stats, May 28, 2009, http://
>
> www.census.gov/econ/estats/2007/2007reportfinal.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2007/2007reportfinal.pdf>, at 2.
>     10 Id. More recent data released in May 2010 show that this
> trend continued in 2008. U.S. Census Bureau, E-Stats, May 27, 2010,
> http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2008/2008reportfinal.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2008/2008reportfinal.pdf>.
>
>     11 U.S. Census Bureau, “Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales:
> 4th Quarter 2008,” Feb. 16, 2010.
>     12 U.S. M-Commerce Sales to Hit $2.4 Billion This Year, ABI
> Research Says, Internet Retailer, Feb. 16, 2010, http://
>
> www.internetretailer.com/2010/02/16/u-s-m-commerce-sales-to-hit-2-4-
> billion-this-year-abi-researc <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.internetretailer.com/2010/02/16/u-s-m-commerce-sales-to-hit-2-4-billion-this-year-abi-researc>.
>     13 Id.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     Notwithstanding this consistent, impressive growth, companies
>
> continue to face significant challenges in their ability to
> appropriately protect their computer systems, secure their proprietary,
> personal, and financial information, and safeguard the integrity of
> business and other transactions that they conduct over the Internet.
>
>     Reports of significant, persistent, individual cyber intrusions
> occur on a regular basis, as do reports of widespread, untargeted cyber
> incidents. The Cyberspace Policy Review described a coordinated attack
>
> in 49 cities on more than 130 automated teller machines in 2008, as
> well as a single 2007 data breach at one company that resulted in more
> than 45 million compromised consumer financial accounts.14 While some
>
> cyber intrusions are highly sophisticated, some require relatively
> little skill or effort. For instance, criminals can use widely
> available, low cost “crimeware kits” to exploit computer systems and
>
> software vulnerabilities in order to launch malware against targeted
> computer systems.15
> —————————————————————————
>
>     14 Cyberspace Policy Review at 2.
>
>     15 See, e.g., Tom Zeller, Jr., Cyberthieves Silently Copy Your
> Passwords as You Type, New York Times, Feb. 27, 2006, available at
> http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/technology/27hack.html <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/technology/27hack.html>.
>
> —————————————————————————
>
>     The financial cost of cyber threats to firms and their customers
> appears to be significant. Though current fraud losses attributed to
>
> cybersecurity data breaches are small in comparison to total annual
> business fraud losses, they are increasing, rising from 7 percent of
> total fraud losses in 2007 to 11 percent in 2008. In 2009, the dollar
> loss from all cases of online crime referred to law enforcement in the
>
> United States reached $550 million, more than twice the 2008 level.16
> —————————————————————————
>
>     16 See Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2009 Internet Crime
>
> Report, http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2009_IC3Report.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2009_IC3Report.pdf>.
>
> —————————————————————————
>
>     Small businesses have just as much reason to focus on cybersecurity
> as do larger enterprises yet they are less likely to have adequately
>
> protected themselves from their risks. According to a National
> Cybersecurity Alliance poll, 65 percent of small businesses store
> customer data online, 43 percent store financial records online, 33
> percent store credit card information online, and 22 percent have
>
> intellectual property and other sensitive corporate content online.17
> The same poll shows that only 14 percent of these firms have anyone
> solely focused on information technology security; only 53 percent
> check their computers to ensure that anti-virus, anti-spyware,
>
> firewalls, and operating systems are up to date; 20 percent say that
> they use the minimum threshold of security to protect customer and
> employee data, but 42 percent believe that their customers are
>
> [[Page 44219]]
>
> concerned about the IT security of their business. Though many
> businesses are increasing their cybersecurity budgets, anecdotally, the
> Task Force has been told that there is a continuous requirement for IT
>
> managers to justify their expenditure of company resources on
> cybersecurity.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     17 National Cyber Security Alliance, Symantec, and Zogby
>
> International; 2009 NCSA/Symantec Small Business Study, Oct. 2009,
> http://www.staysafeonline.org/files/2009SMBStudy/
>
> FullSMBStudy2009%20FINAL.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.staysafeonline.org/files/2009SMBStudy/FullSMBStudy2009%20FINAL.pdf>, at 4.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     Given this state of affairs, the Task Force believes that public
> policies affecting cybersecurity on the Internet, as well as private
>
> sector norms (both good and bad), require a fresh look. The Task Force
> recognizes the valuable roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of
> the private sector in creating tools and strategies to mitigate cyber
>
> risks associated with the Internet. More broadly, over the past two
> decades, the nation has benefitted greatly from industry-led, Internet-
> driven innovation and growth, with those benefits reflected throughout
>
> the entire economy. That said, the persistence of the cybersecurity
> challenges compels the Department to seek a better understanding of
> both how those challenges are affecting U.S. businesses and citizens,
> as well as useful steps that can enhance the security of e-commerce.
>
> Small, medium, and large businesses, and consumers, will continue to
> increase their reliance on the Internet. As that reliance grows, the
> level of cybersecurity must increase as well.
>     Contribution of This NOI to the Internet Policy Task Force:
>
> Responses to this Notice will assist the Department’s Internet Policy
> Task Force in preparing a report on cybersecurity, innovation and the
> Internet economy. The primary purposes of the report will be to
> identify and evaluate cybersecurity challenges facing commercial actors
>
> and consumers outside the critical infrastructure and key resources
> sectors to analyze various approaches to meet those challenges. The
> Department would also like to know how it can improve its execution of
> core cybersecurity responsibilities, including those supporting CIKR
>
> sectors and their customers. The Task Force’s report may include
> options and recommendations for changes in public policy, as well as
> recommendations for voluntary steps that will enhance the commercial
> sector’s and consumers’ cybersecurity preparedness. The Task Force is
>
> hopeful that the dialogue launched here and the responses to this
> inquiry will contribute to Administration-wide policy positions and
> global cybersecurity strategy.
>
> Request for Comment
>
>     The primary focus of this inquiry, as reflected above and in the
>
> questions listed below, is on enhancing the cybersecurity practices of
> commercial actors, consumers, and citizens outside the CIKR sectors.
> Activities involving government systems, other critical infrastructures
>
> and key resources receive attention from the Department of Homeland
> Security and other agencies. As such, they are not the main subject of
> this inquiry. The questions below are intended to help frame the issues
>
> and should not be construed as a limitation on comments that parties
> may submit. Comments containing references, studies, research, and
> other empirical data that are not widely published should include
> copies of the referenced materials. Comments will be posted at http://
>
> www.ntia.doc.gov/internetpolicytaskforce <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.ntia.doc.gov/internetpolicytaskforce> and http://csrc.nist.gov <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://csrc.nist.gov>.
>
> 1. Quantifying the Economic Impact
>
>     Prior to releasing this NOI, the Task Force conducted listening
> sessions with a wide range of stakeholders in order to understand the
> issues that have the greatest bearing on cybersecurity preparedness and
>
> continued growth of the Internet economy. During those conversations,
> the Task Force heard that while cybersecurity threats continue to pose
> challenges for Internet users and services providers, it appears
> difficult to assess the macro- and microeconomic impact of
>
> cybersecurity incidents with current tools. It is hard to manage that
> which one cannot measure.
>     Losses related to Internet fraud (e.g., payment fraud, identity
> theft, credit card fraud) are collected and reported to various
>
> government and private entities. However, data that describe the
> economic impact of cybersecurity incidents more fully and completely,
> either at the firm or sector level, are not readily available. Not only
> are losses difficult to quantify with today’s tools, but it appears to
>
> be difficult to assess in economic terms the return on investments
> achieved via security measures. Measures of business and consumer
> investment in security-related activities lack a common reporting
> entity or information aggregating mechanism.
>
>     The availability of authoritative, aggregated data on cybersecurity
> investments and losses from cyber incidents might yield a quantitative
> picture of the economic impact of cyber intrusions and attacks. Such
>
> data would enable industry and the government to evaluate the severity
> of cybersecurity threats and emerging trends and to make informed
> decisions about the trade-offs of different cybersecurity strategies
> and investment options.
>
>     We seek comment on the following questions: How should a data
> gathering and analysis system (or systems) be fashioned to facilitate
> the collection of well-defined, consistent metrics to measure the
> financial impact of cybersecurity incidents and investments in
>
> cybersecurity protection? What would be the implementation challenges?
> Are there adequate incentives for businesses to provide information
> about security breaches, data security losses, and cybersecurity
> investments? It would be beneficial from a national perspective to have
>
> a greater understanding of the financial costs and benefits of
> different cybersecurity practices. Does the private sector, however,
> lack incentives to share information at the firm level? What are
> reasonable means to acquire the data necessary for greater
>
> understanding? At what level of granularity should data be collected
> and analyzed? What would be the appropriate entity to perform
> collection and analysis of the data? Aside from assessing the known
> costs of cyber intrusions and attacks and of cybersecurity measures,
>
> what other data would be helpful to better understand the question of
> whether at the firm, sector and national levels enough is being done to
> adequately protect the nation’s information and communications systems?
>
> Can the opportunity costs associated with inadequate security be
> estimated in some way?
>
> 2. Raising Awareness
>
>     At the highest level of abstraction, the nation has pursued for the
> past several years a two-prong strategy for dealing with cybersecurity
>
> issues, namely, the continual development of cyber-protection
> technology and techniques, paired with the sharing of information about
> those capabilities, about new threats and vulnerabilities, and about
> data breaches (where required by law). Based on the Task Force’s
>
> examination to date, these strategies will remain important. The
> dynamic nature of the cyber risk environment demands continuous
> innovation in cyber-protection capability. Ongoing improvements in
> education and other forms of awareness-raising are also necessary,
>
> given the fact that a significant proportion of Internet economy
> participants do not take adequate advantage of readily available cyber-
> protection tools.
>     In response to the President’s Cyberspace Policy Review, the U.S.
>
> Government is stepping up its investment in education and awareness-
> raising. For example, NIST has assumed overall coordination
> responsibility for a new National Initiative for
>
> [[Page 44220]]
>
> Cybersecurity Education (NICE).18 NICE has four tracks, each
>
> delegated to particular federal agencies. The tracks include: (1)
> National Cybersecurity Awareness led by the DHS; (2) K-12 and
> university-level Cybersecurity Education led by the Department of
> Education and the White House’s Office of Science and Technology
>
> Policy; (3) the creation of a Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Structure
> led by the Office of Personnel Management; and (4) the creation of a
> Cybersecurity Workforce Training effort led by the DOD, DHS, and the
>
> Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Department also
> recognizes that across the private sector, there are many initiatives–
> some nationally led, others locally led, some including public-private
>
> partnerships–aimed at improving cybersecurity awareness among
> businesses, consumers, and students.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     18 National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE),
>
> Relationship to President’s Education Agenda (April 19, 2010),
> http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
>
> cybersecurity_niceeducation.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/cybersecurity_niceeducation.pdf>; see also Commerce Secretary Gary
> Locke Announces NIST to Lead National Initiative for Cybersecurity
> Education, (April 29, 2010), http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-
>
> releases/2010/04/29/commerce-secretary-gary-locke-announces-nist-
> lead-national-initiative <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2010/04/29/commerce-secretary-gary-locke-announces-nist-lead-national-initiative>.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     We seek comment on the efficacy of existing educational efforts, as
>
> well as the steps that might be taken to improve them. Are there data
> that demonstrate that certain educational programs qualify as best
> practices? What have those who are delivering cybersecurity education
> learned from their experiences? Which educational plans are succeeding
>
> or failing, and have providers of such educational efforts attempted to
> measure return-on-investment? What additional role, if any, should the
> government play in cybersecurity education and awareness efforts? What
>
> programs, beyond continuing education for IT professionals, workplace
> training for users, or curriculum development for K-12 or post-
> secondary institutions, should be developed? Does the private sector
> require government assistance in developing the kinds of materials and
>
> programs that would be useful in this area? Who should be the target
> audiences?
>     Given the dynamic nature of cyber threats, it is important for even
> the most sophisticated commercial entities to be vigilant. One of the
>
> best ways to improve defensive capabilities is for good actors to share
> important information with each other and with appropriate authorities.
> Yet in our listening sessions, we heard comments that questioned
>
> whether enough is being done on this front. Security breach legislation
> has gone into effect in many states.19 Nonetheless, our current
> perception is that for many reasons firms that have experienced cyber
> intrusions or attacks either do not know with whom to share that
>
> information or are reluctant to share.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     19 See, e.g., California Database Breach Act, California Civil
> Code Sec. Sec.  1798.80-1798.82 (enacted in 2002).
>
> —————————————————————————
>
>     In the immediate aftermath of a recent, high-profile cyber
> incident, we heard a variation on this theme. Reportedly, even the most
>
> sophisticated small and medium-sized firms are daunted by how
> complicated it can be to share information on the incidents they have
> suffered. A successful, targeted intrusion might involve exploitation
> of a technology vulnerability, loss of customer information, theft of
>
> intellectual property or other digital assets, and loss of financial
> information. Such an exploit might be executed and addressed in a
> matter of minutes or hours, yet reporting the incident and the losses
> to the proper officials could consume numerous man-hours, with business
>
> owners unsure whether the expenditure of that amount of time yields any
> benefit to the business.
>     We seek comment on whether there is adequate awareness of
> information sharing programs. Are existing information sharing
>
> mechanisms adequately-resourced but under-utilized? If so, what deters
> their use? How can the state of affairs be improved? Are there parts of
> the business community that do not know the governmental points-of-
>
> contact, US-CERT, to report, share information on, and seek guidance
> regarding cybersecurity incidents? If there are parts of the business
> community that are unaware of available resources, which parts are they
>
> and what steps might help to raise their awareness? Even among that who
> are aware of the resources and mechanisms available for information
> sharing and assistance, is there a reluctance to use them? If so, why?
>
> Does the government adequately assist businesses in the throes or in
> the aftermath of a cyber incident? Should the government create a
> cybersecurity service center to assist the business community in
> implementing protection measures, sharing information about cyber
>
> threats reported by businesses and other sources, and dealing with
> cybersecurity incidents that occur? What other steps can be taken to
> improve situational awareness across the business sector?
>
> 3. Web Site and Component Security
>
>     Increasingly, malware and other malicious content are able to
> infect computers and other user access devices (e.g., smart phones) in
> a manner that compromises the integrity of commercial and personal
> information. Such exploits are often launched through interactive Web
>
> sites that end users access online and through the use of external
> devices (e.g., portable USB drives, digital picture frames). While
> computer training and consumer education programs can reduce the amount
> of malware spread through these means by instructing users in safer
>
> online practices, there may be other mechanisms or systems that could
> prove effective in reducing such cyber risks.
>     In Department of Commerce listening sessions, stakeholders
> identified improved Web site and component security as another area
>
> where modest technology investments might generate large improvements
> in the level of cybersecurity across the Internet. Should the
> government alone, the private sector, or the government and private
> sector collaboratively explore whether third-party verification of Web
>
> site and component security is or can prove effective in reducing the
> proliferation of malware? If so, what measures should be considered?
> What would be the implementation challenges in deploying such measures?
>
> 4. Authentication/Identity (ID) Management
>
>     In our listening sessions, several stakeholders urged the Task
> Force to promote more widespread uptake of state-of-the-art
> authentication and ID management systems to reduce the incidents of
>
> successful cyber intrusions and attacks. Effective authentication and
> authorization systems establish a user’s right to access resources.
> Many users currently rely on simple password systems for
> authentication. More sophisticated systems require multiple factors in
>
> the authentication process, for example, something the user knows, plus
> something that the user possesses (e.g., a physical credential or
> token).20
>
> [[Page 44221]]
>
> The Department seeks comment on the effectiveness of current identity
>
> management systems in addressing cybersecurity risks.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     20 Usability, expense, and support issues are significant
> considerations in selection of authentication and authorization
>
> controls. Most of these systems identify the user. Where the
> identity of the user is important to a system’s access policy,
> issuance and maintenance of credentials depends on an underlying
> identity management system. Effective identity management systems
>
> establish one party’s identity to another party’s satisfaction,
> increasing consumer trust in the use of the Internet, while
> balancing the security and privacy concerns of all users involved.
> It is worthwhile to remember that “users” are not a homogeneous
>
> group. They consist of individuals, and small, medium, and large
> enterprises, both public and private. The diversity of the
> characteristics among these various categories of users means that
> each group will make selections among various security solutions
>
> based on different criteria that address their unique needs and
> economic drivers. Privacy considerations also significantly
> complicate identification based on personally identifiable
> information. For many purposes, identification needs to simply
>
> associate the user’s request for access or service with an
> institutional authorization by the entity that is providing the
> access or service. By contrast, more sensitive transactions (e.g.,
> online banking or exchange of electronic health records) may require
>
> authentication of more of an individual’s identifying
> characteristics. Various audit and enforcement functions benefit
> from identification of the access with a specific person, but this
> is not necessary for all use cases.
>
> —————————————————————————
>
>     On June 25, 2010, the White House released the National Strategy
> for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace for public comment. This strategy
>
> promotes a set of options for enhancing on-line security and privacy so
> that individuals and organizations use trusted, interoperable identity
> solution as in a manner that promotes confidence, privacy, choice, and
>
> innovation to experience efficient and secure access to on line
> services.21
> —————————————————————————
>
>     21 National Strategy for Secure Identities in Cyberspace, at 1
>
> (June 25, 2010), available at  http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
>
> ns_tic.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ns_tic.pdf>.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     Beyond the measures recommended in the National Strategy for
> Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, what, if any, federal government
>
> support is needed to improve authentication/identity management
> controls, mechanisms, and supporting infrastructures? Do the
> authentication and/or identity management controls employed by
> commercial organizations or business sectors, in general, provide
>
> adequate assurance? If not, what improvements are needed? What specific
> controls and mechanisms should be implemented? What role should
> authentication and identity management controls play in a comprehensive
> set of cybersecurity measures available to commercial organizations?
>
> Are the basic infrastructures that underlie the recommended controls
> and mechanisms already in place? What, if any, new tools or
> technologies for authentication or identify management are available or
> are being developed that may address these needs?
>
>     How can the expense associated with improved authentication/
> identity management controls and mechanisms be justified financially?
> How can the U.S. Government best support improvement of authentication/
> identity management controls, mechanisms, and supporting
>
> infrastructures? Is there a continuing need for limited revelation
> identity systems, or even anonymous identity processes and credentials?
> If so, what would be the potential benefits of wide-scale adoption of
>
> limited revelation identity systems or anonymous credentialing from a
> cybersecurity perspective? What would be the drawbacks?
>     How might government procurement activities best promote
> development of a market for more effective authentication tools for use
>
> by government agencies and commercial entities? Could a private
> marketplace for “identity brokers” (i.e., organizations that can be
> trusted to establish identity databases and issue identity credentials
>
> adequate for authorizing financial transactions and accessing private
> sector components of critical infrastructures) fulfill this need
> effectively? What would be some of the issues or potential impacts of
> establishing standards and best practices for private sector identity
>
> brokers? Should the government establish a program to support the
> development of technical standards, metrology, test beds, and
> conformance criteria to take into account user concerns such as how to:
> (1) Improve interoperability; (2) strengthen authentication methods;
>
> (3) improve privacy protection through authentication and security
> protocols; and (4) improve the usability of identity management
> systems? What are the privacy issues raised by identity management
> systems and how should those issues be addressed? Are there particular
>
> privacy and civil liberties questions raised by government involvement
> in identity management system design and/or operations? What other
> considerations should factor into government’s efforts in this area?
>
> 5. Global Engagement
>
>     Cybersecurity issues are global. Companies want to design,
> manufacture, and test their products to make them available for sale in
> a global marketplace. Many in industry have described fear about the
>
> potential for balkanization of the global marketplace due to a
> proliferation of mandated, sometimes unique cybersecurity standards and
> conformity assessment requirements among nations–leading to a diverse
> patchwork of national requirements that can inhibit trade. Such unique
>
> national standards and conformity assessment requirements illustrate
> one way in which some foreign governments seem to be deviating from
> international norms by using security standards as a de facto entry
> barrier to protect domestic interests from foreign competition.
>
>     We request comment on what other cybersecurity-related problems
> U.S. businesses may be experiencing when attempting to do business in
> foreign countries. Please specify discrete areas of concern, such as
> foreign governments requiring access to product source code. Do U.S.
>
> businesses confront unfair competition when competing against
> nationally controlled companies? If so, in which countries? How can the
> U.S. Government better encourage the use of internationally accepted
> cybersecurity standards and practices outside of the United States? Are
>
> there more effective ways for the U.S. Government to engage countries
> that deviate from international norms (i.e., bilaterally,
> multilaterally, through technical dialogues, at an overarching
> political level, all of these or through other mechanisms)? Would a set
>
> of internationally accepted “cybersecurity principles” in the area of
> standards and conformity assessment procedures be useful? If so, what
> role should the Department of Commerce play in promoting such
>
> internationally accepted principles?
>
> 6. Product Assurance
>
>     As noted above, many cybersecurity issues are global, but product
> assurance is one global issue that warrants particular attention. In
> the course of conversations with hardware and software developers, the
>
> Task Force has heard repeatedly that current domestic and international
> government product assurance efforts for many products can contribute
> to costly time-to-market delays, as well as unnecessarily expensive
>
> products. Several companies felt that the current U.S. Common Criteria
> assurance scheme is incompatible with industry product development and
> maintenance schedules and practices, and that the security assurance
>
> derived from many national assurance requirements and evaluation
> schemes is highly questionable.22 Additionally, participation in
> international mutual recognition schemes is, reportedly, so limited
> that some in industry see themselves as expending very significant
>
> resources to satisfy a range of varying security requirements and
> processes among nations in order to compete in a global market.
> Industry members have expressed a desire for assistance in improving
> mutual recognition in the product assurance realm.
>
> —————————————————————————
>
>     22 More information about the US Common Criteria assurance
> scheme is available at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
>
> theccra.html <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/theccra.html>.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     We seek comment on the following matters. Do current U.S.
> Government
>
> [[Page 44222]]
>
> product assurance requirements inhibit production of timely security
>
> components and/or security-enhanced IT products and systems? Do current
> assurance processes inhibit innovation? If so, what would be the best
> way to improve the current U.S. product assurance scheme? What, if any,
>
> changes need to be made with respect to international product assurance
> institutions, standards, and processes (e.g., the Common Criteria
> Recognition Arrangement)? Should the Common Criteria Recognition
> Arrangement, the basis for international mutual recognition of
>
> cybersecurity product assurance, be expanded to include some of those
> countries which increasingly stray from international norms? Can useful
> U.S. Government or international product assurance guidelines be
> crafted for the current real-world software development environment? To
>
> what extent can a security oriented software assurance “tool” be
> useful in software validation? What elements would be necessary to
> develop an effective industry-government dialogue to clarify the
> product assurance goals and challenges, and identify workable
>
> solutions?
>
> 7. Research and Development
>
>     The U.S. Government has a continuing interest in cybersecurity
> research and development and has funded research on various aspects of
> security in computing, networking, and data processing for decades.
>
> Together with research and development programs at NIST, DOD, and
> several other agencies, the current unclassified Federal funding in
> Cyber Security and Information Assurance Research and Development is
> approximately $350 million per year. One of the goals of the
>
> Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) initiated in
> January 2008 is to develop “leap-ahead” technologies that would
> achieve orders-of-magnitude improvements in cybersecurity. Based on
>
> this directive, in 2009, the agencies of the NITRD Program identified
> three initial research and development themes to exemplify and motivate
> future federal cybersecurity game-change research activities.23 In
>
> addition to eliminating redundancies in federally funded cybersecurity
> research, identifying research gaps, and prioritizing research and
> development efforts, the Federal government has actively sought to
> create incentives for private industry and academic institutions to
>
> increase their research and development efforts.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     23 For more information, please visit http://
>
> cybersecurity.nitrd.gov <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://cybersecurity.nitrd.gov>.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     The following questions should be considered from the perspective
> of the Department of Commerce. How can the federal government best
>
> promote additional commercial and academic research and development in
> cybersecurity technology? What particular research and development
> areas do not receive sufficient attention in the private sector? What
> cybersecurity disciplines most need research and development resources
>
> (e.g., performance metrics, availability, status monitoring, usability,
> and cost effectiveness)? How effective would a federal government-
> sponsored “grand challenge program” be at drawing attention to and
>
> promoting work on specific technical problems?
>
> 8. An Incentives Framework for Evolving Cyber-Risk Options and
> Cybersecurity Best Practices
>
>     Outside the CIKR sectors, U.S. businesses and consumers generally
>
> have resorted to their own devices and evolved their own practices for
> dealing (or not dealing) with cyber risks. In other words, across large
> segments of the economy, the level of cybersecurity relies upon the
>
> private sector’s development, dissemination and adoption of best
> practices. As Internet usage has grown domestically and abroad, U.S.
> companies have been faced with a range of Internet-related issues.
> Based on feedback the Task Force received, the adoption of industry
>
> best practices is uneven.
>     According to some stakeholders, smaller and medium sized businesses
> may lack the specialized knowledge and resources necessary to meet
> cybersecurity challenges. Some stakeholders also suggested that the
>
> fundamental challenge may be a misalignment of incentives. Still others
> argued for greater leadership from industry and/or government in
> developing improved standards for securing cyberspace in a manner that
> will promote greater economic benefits from an expanding Internet
>
> economy. These assertions suggest several questions:
>     Are existing incentives adequate to address the current risk
> environment? Do particular business segments lack sufficient incentives
> to make cybersecurity investments? If so, why? What would be the best
>
> way to encourage businesses to make appropriate investments in
> cybersecurity? Are there public policies or private sector initiatives
> in the United States or other countries that have successfully
> increased incentives to make such security investments? Are there
>
> disincentives that inhibit cybersecurity investments by firms? If so,
> what should be done to eliminate them?
>     Are there examples of cybersecurity best practices that have been
> (or can be) sufficiently tailored to meet the diverse needs of
>
> commercial actors outside the CIKR sectors? Are those best practices
> well known and understood? Should a set, or sets, of best practices be
> developed to guide commercial organizations’ investment decisions? What
>
> role, if any, should the U.S. Government play in their development?
>     Are minimum performance standards for cybersecurity necessary to
> protect individual and collective security interests? If so, how should
> those minimum standards be determined and what could be done to promote
>
> their adoption? Would a collaborative government-private sector
> partnership be appropriate here? What are the merits of providing legal
> safe-harbors to those individuals and commercial entities that meet a
> specified minimum security level? By contrast, what would be the merits
>
> or implications of enhancing existing frameworks that hold entities
> accountable for failure to exercise reasonable care and that results in
> a loss due to inadequate security measures? Should an entity be
> required to implement a cybersecurity plan or meet a set of minimum
>
> security standards prior to receiving government financial guarantees
> or assistance? Would it be beneficial to utilize government procurement
> policies to stimulate cybersecurity research, development, and
> investment generally? How do national security requirements affect the
>
> commercial sector’s adoption of cybersecurity protection measures?
>     In addition, companies traditionally carry insurance protection to
> mitigate various business, natural disaster, and political risks. The
>
> growth of the Internet has begun to create a demand for new insurance
> products that specifically address the risk of Internet
> connectivity.24 While there is growth in the adoption of cyber
> insurance, a compelling economic case for large scale underwriting of
>
> cyber risk insurance, apparently, has not been made. As noted above,
> metrics for establishing the basis for underwriting appear inadequate.
> —————————————————————————
>
>     24 The market for cyber insurance was estimated to be $350
> million in 2005, from a negligible amount almost a decade earlier.
> George Mason University School of Law, Critical Infrastructure
> Protection Program, The CIP Report, at 2 (Sept. 2007), http://
>
> cip.gmu.edu/archive/cip_report_6.3.pdf <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://cip.gmu.edu/archive/cip_report_6.3.pdf>.
>
> —————————————————————————
>
> [[Page 44223]]
>
>     What role could/should public policy play, if any, in the
>
> development of a cyber-risk measurement framework that would be useful
> in developing insurance products? In the face of growing risk from the
> increasing volume of cyber threats and vulnerabilities, what data can
>
> be made available to companies to support decisions regarding
> protection through the purchase of insurance products or investing more
> in cybersecurity protection controls? If companies were able to
> predictably limit financial risk through specific cyber-insurance
>
> coverage at a reliably predictable cost, how would this affect
> investment in cyber-security programs and infrastructure?
>     To what extent might insurance providers create incentives or
> requirements for such investment? In the absence of empirical data to
>
> quantify losses from certain types of cyber incidents, what criteria
> could be used to most accurately and effectively determine premium
> costs? What, if any, quantitative relationship can be established
> between investment in security controls and the cost of insurance?
>
>     Dated: July 22, 2010.
> Gary Locke,
> Secretary of Commerce.
> Patrick Gallagher,
> Director, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
> Francisco J. S[aacute]nchez,
> Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, International
>
> Trade Administration.
> Lawrence E. Strickling,
> Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, National
> Telecommunications and Information Administration.
> [FR Doc. 2010-18507 Filed 7-27-10; 8:45 am]
>
> BILLING CODE 3510-13-P
>
>
>
>
>